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As take up of the Internet in China rises toward the 50 million mark,
speculation concerning the social and political impact of this new tech-
nology on the authoritarian state has grown accordingly. While much of
the earliest writing on the phenomenon tended to be of a journalistic bent,
two recent reports from US-based think-tanks, RAND and the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, attempt to take the field to a new
level of sophistication. At the same time, the appearance of Chinese
writing about the Internet from a variety of perspectives might provide
material for broadening out the research agenda into new areas of
sociological inquiry, and beyond the narrow question of whether the
spread of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) leads to
liberal political change.
Considering how so much of the belief in the potential of the Internet
to transform authoritarian states has been encouraged by policy-makers
rather than academics, the strength of both the RAND and Carnegie
reports lies in the way that they avoid the temptation to exaggerate the
significance of dissident activity in cyberspace. Instead, they pay close
attention to how the state deters and monitors the Internet through a
combination of low-tech and hi-tech methods. In this respect, You’ve Got
Dissent is somewhat the stronger of the two reports because it has enough
space to go into detail, while Open Networks only dedicates one chapter
to China.1 You’ve Got Dissent provides reasonably detailed accounts of
how dissidents have been hauled before the authorities and accused of
various activities; lists of the main regulatory principles that have been
established to demarcate what is deemed to be acceptable activity; and an
1. The other case studies are Cuba, Singapore, Vietnam and Burma, the United Arab
Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Egypt.
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overview of the physical shutdowns of network resources that have
occurred. Social scientists lacking in technological training should also be
grateful for explanations of how methods of control actually work, such
as the proxy server system and the blocking of email from dissident
websites outside China. With regard to hacking, the reader is even told
how to trace culprits back to the Ministry of Public Security in Beijing
(pp. 74–76)! A list of addresses of dissident websites is contained in the
appendix for those who wish to do some browsing for themselves.
Given Chase and Mulvenon’s detailed description of the main practices
of control and surveillance deployed by the state, however, it is rather
mystifying why the report should finish on the optimistic note that “the
scale of China’s information-technology modernization would suggest
that time is eventually on the side of the regime’s opponents” (p. 89).
Although the first half of the book deals with dissident activity in
cyberspace, it provides no real evidence to suggest that this has been
successful for political mobilization inside China. Most of the case
studies are actually related to overseas groups, and the authors elsewhere
describe how the state is able to block these from penetrating inside
China proper. Sometimes links between domestic and overseas activities
are merely implied. The demonstration organized by the falun gong in
April 1999, for example, is juxtaposed with detailed descriptions of the
movement’s activities in cyberspace outside China’s firewalls. But no real
linkage between these two phenomena is established, other than a foot-
note citing a report in the Christian Science Monitor. It could be added
that the possibility that the Internet played an important role in the 1999
demonstration does not seem to sit well with the report’s own observa-
tions that most of the participants were elderly females, while 80 per cent
of Internet users in China are under 35 years of age and 60 per cent are
male. The frequent notes of optimism over the liberating potential of the
Internet that pepper this text do not, therefore, really square with the
evidence that is presented.
Perhaps, then, it is a good corrective to read You’ve Got Dissent in
tandem with Open Networks, because Kalathil and Boas actually set out
to question the “conventional wisdom” that the Internet is a force for
liberal political change in authoritarian states, by developing “a frame-
work that allows for methodological thinking about limited evidence”
(p. 3). The result is a much broader analysis, ordered under the categories
of civil society, politics and the state, the economy and the international
sphere. It is also a more sociological work in the way it locates the
appropriation of the Internet both in the comparative context of other
authoritarian states, and the specific cultural context of the nation-build-
ing project in China. The difference between the conclusions in this work
and those reached in You’ve Got Dissent is indicated by the title of the
final chapter, Beyond Blind Optimism.
The authors of Open Networks thus develop an argument that is both
comparatively nuanced and cautious, effectively broadening the debate
beyond issues of dissidents-versus-the-state and toward more complex
issues concerning the relationship between technological and social
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change by highlighting a number of important issues. How, for example,
can bureaucratic organizations be developed to build and police the
Internet, while competition is introduced into the IT sector to make it
internationally competitive at the same time? How can the state maintain
control while informatization be used to boost economic development,
improve administrative efficiency, address the digital divide between the
eastern and western provinces? And how can national security be main-
tained while foreign technology and know-how are adopted on a large
scale? Within these dynamics, important signs of change can be seen,
such as the erosion of the State Administration of Radio, Film and
Television’s (SARFT) monopoly on news information caused by the turf
war between the MII and SARFT due to broadband convergence. Simi-
larly, the authors acknowledge the existence of government officials who
see informatization as “changing the very scope and structure of govern-
ment processes” (p. 24). Yet they are also careful to emphasize that
change does not necessarily mean democratization, as indicated by the
high salience of nationalistic activity in Chinese cyberspace.
If Open Networks is effective in questioning the conventional wisdom,
though, the fact that its coverage of China is confined to one chapter
makes it rather limited for country specialists and for those interested in
the sociology of technology. It is also somewhat puzzling that the authors
should feel the need to state that “little attention has been paid to the issue
in academia” (p. 3) when their work does in fact owe much to the
sizeable body of academic literature that has already appeared on the
subject of the Internet in China and the sociology of ICTs in general. In
fact, the movement away from technological determinism took place
several years ago in Internet studies, as the panoply of methods available
for the state to stage its counter-revolution began to emerge. Given the
large number of international agreements on data sharing and electronic
surveillance to which most states in the world have signed up since 11
September 2001, or the uncertain fate of the CIA sponsored Triangle Boy
project (which was supposed to provide Internet users in authoritarian
states with online anonymity), the issue of regulating cyberspace is
certainly more pressing than that of using it to bring about regime-change
– especially for policy-makers. Give or take a few terrorists, child
pornographers or money launderers, does anybody still believe that a
completely unregulated Internet is a desirable thing?
Despite such developments, however, seminal works such as Boyle’s
application of the Foucauldian Panopticon concept to explain the culture
of self-surveillance in cyberspace,2 or Lessig’s arguments concerning
whether it is possible to regulate cyberspace,3 are either not mentioned or
just touched on in passing. Considering that Kalathil and Boas wish to
critique the “conventional wisdom” that the Internet undermines authori-
2. James Boyle, “Foucault in cyberspace: surveillance, sovereignty, and hard-wired
censors,” posted online 1997, http://www.wcl.american.edu/pub/faculty/boyle/foucault.htm
(accessed 6 November 2000).
3. Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (New York: Basic Books, 1999).
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tarian regimes, they could also have been more critical of the motives of
the policy-makers from whom such a view has originated by drawing on
the work of writers like Ethan Kapstein.4 However, although Kalathil and
Boas do not really come to grips with such issues, they do touch on a
number of important areas of research that have been developed in
Internet studies and pose enough questions to indicate a rich agenda for
future research.
A good example of one such issue is the relationship between the state,
Chinese commercial Internet firms and foreign firms under WTO rules.
This is raised when Kalathil and Boas mention the partnership that has
been established between AOL-Time Warner and Legend, China’s top
PC manufacturer. To gain further insight into such issues, it might be
useful to begin to draw on some of the Chinese literature concerning the
Internet that is now appearing in abundance. A good example is Lian-
xiang jituan chuanji 18 nian, the popular biography of Liu Chuanzhi,
former president and managing director of Legend Computers, by Song
Huaijiang, a doctoral graduate of Beijing University. Here the links
between private enterprise and the state are laid out fairly clearly. The
firm was established in 1984 with funding from CAS, and quickly
achieved a domestic monopoly on the technology for inputting and
displaying Chinese characters. With the CAS name behind it, Legend was
able to raise funds in Hong Kong to enter the international OEM market
in 1988. In 1994, CAS came to the rescue again by providing a new
injection of cash to allow Legend to keep up with the IT boom. The firm
plays a faithful role in return, having taken a lead in building the
infrastructure that makes possible the state’s plans for e-government and
e-commerce. When the firm launched its global Internet strategy in 1999,
it chose the ancient capital city of Xi’an for the opening ceremony,
indicating its commitment to the project of linking the whole of China to
the globalization process (p. 228).
The most interesting aspect of biographical literature, though, is what
it tells the reader about the character or the main subject. It is not hard
to see why Liu should have been considered to be the right person to play
the leading role in Legend. Born in 1944, he received his original training
at the Military Telecommunications Academy in 1961–67, then spent a
year carrying out defence-orientated research in Chengdu. He moved on
to CAS in 1970, after his Cultural Revolution spell of agricultural labour
at Zhuhai, Guangdong (p. 278). When Liu was selected to establish and
lead the new firm, he was stationed in the cadre section of CAS. By
March 1998 he had been appointed to the National People’s Congress. In
short, Liu and his enterprise have been cultivated by the state so that
Legend can become a member of China’s National Team of very large
enterprises fit for competition in the global market.
It is not surprising then that Liu’s management jargon is fully in tune
with the state’s nation-building project. He sums up a vision of his firm’s
4. Ethan B. Kapstein, Hegemony Wired: American Politics and the New Economy (Paris:
Institut Francais de Relations Internationales, 2000).
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development from small enterprise through national enterprise to global
corporation using militaristic metaphors, such as moving through the
three stages of “speedboat mode, ship structure, flotilla mode” (“ping di
kuai chuan moshi, da chuan jiegou, jiandui moshi”) (p. 75–79). Similarly,
his “Three Factors of Management,” namely “organize the troops, fix the
strategy, lead the team” (zuzhi tuandui, ding zhanlue, dai duiwu), is
reminiscent of the slogans imposed on his generation by decades of
political indoctrination. Lenin himself would not have blushed at the idea
of building a core of leaders who share common ideals, unite to co-oper-
ate and possess the strength to engage in “struggle.” Mao might well have
recognized the call to “fix the strategy” by calling on cadres at all levels
to be aware of the general situation, consider the long-term, then break
down the main objectives into particular tactics while always being able
to adapt. Deng Xiaoping would have approved of “leading the team” by
creating a special culture for the enterprise, consolidating the strength of
its personnel, creating an atmosphere of professionalism, cultivating
leaders and establishing a firm base for the future. He would also have
approved of Liu’s belief that his thinking is distinct from foreign manage-
ment theory due to its emphasis on collective leadership, consensus
building and the need to enter into a kind of contract with the firm to
prevent the extremes that might arise from either individual leadership or
factionalism (pp. 68–70).
If Liu Chuanzhi’s story provides interesting insights into the politiciza-
tion of management theory in the Chinese commercial ICT sector, Ehua
budui: weilai guofang wuli, a report on military training by two Tai-
wanese experts on military affairs, Li Anfu and Song Binggang, illus-
trates what happens when informatization leads managerialism to impact
on military doctrine. While much of this work is an exhaustive technical
account of the impact of ICTs on military doctrine that is framed mainly
in the standard literature on the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA),
the fifth chapter is most interesting from a sociological point of view
because it deals with the problem of adapting military education and
training during an era of very rapid technological transition. In doing so,
the authors divide their subject into sections that deal with the need to
make changes to ideas, modes of operation, system building, and cultural
and psychological factors.
When read alongside Song Huaijiang’s book, however, a striking irony
emerges as it becomes apparent that military thinkers in Taiwan propose
that they can meet the demands of the information revolution by using
management theory, while a Chinese entrepreneur like Liu Chuanzhi
believes that he can manage his business according to pithy slogans
reminiscent of CCP propaganda. While Liu envisions his flotilla sailing
out into the world, Li and Song see the armed forces structuring them-
selves like commercial enterprises that constantly renew themselves in
order to survive in the global marketplace. Whereas Liu sees his troops
advancing under a collective leadership with himself at the core, Li and
Song look to Organizational Behaviour theory5 to strike the optimal
5. They cite Stephen P. Robbins, Organizational Behaviour, p. 228 ff.
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balance between hierarchy and levelling out, face the conflicts imposed
when the art of strategy clashes with the nature of technology, to establish
a workable relationship between collectivist ideals and individualism, and
to maintain the continuity of organizations as they go through different
stages of restructuring.
Perhaps what is seen in these two books, then, is some kind of erosion
of the barriers between militaristic and commercial thinking as different
social sectors turn to managerial thinking as they try to address the
growing dependence of organizations on knowledge as a resource and a
commodity. The predicaments faced in both sectors are indeed pressing.
Li and Song illustrate this by citing the examples of Middle Eastern
armies that have acquired high technology weaponry only to discover that
they do not have competent personnel to operate it (p. 271). They find the
answer in the establishment of a US-style School of Information Warfare
and Strategy, and having training systems focusing on long, medium and
short-range scenarios, co-ordinated like the hands of a wristwatch
(p. 277). Liu Chuanzhi, meanwhile, wonders how to foster and retain
creative personnel in a mobile labour market with increasing foreign
competition for talent. His answer is to combine recognition and reward
of individual talent with collective leadership and an appeal to patriotic
and selfless values.
The common problem that unites military and business managers most
of all is the way in which their growing dependence on technological
expertise gives an unprecedented degree of power and status to young
professionals in both the military and civilian sectors. Liu Chuanzhi
laments the loss of the ideals of honesty, seeking glory, hard work, thrift
and patriotism, that were characteristic of the firm’s founding generation.
Although the Spartan spirit is still supposed to be at the core of Legend’s
value system, Liu cannot help but complain about the decline of collec-
tivist values that began to take place when Legend started to recruit
personnel from sources other than CAS back in 1988. Members of this
new generation, mainly in their thirties, were more interested in seeking
their own personal glory, were already accustomed to good working
conditions and were fully aware that they could take up other job
opportunities if they were not satisfied with the treatment they received
at Legend. He reminds the new generation of employees that the greater
part of what they produce should go back to their country, because
without the CAS name behind it, his firm would never have even broken
into the OEM market let alone grown to its present size.
Li and Song, on the other hand, grapple with the problem of how to
restructure a hierarchical system in which the senior ranks are technolog-
ically illiterate in comparison with their subordinates. They find the
answer in the idea of “popularized defence” (“guofang shiwu quanmin-
hua”), which means integrating the civilian and defence industries in
ways that both maximize the cross-fertilization of technologies and allow
individuals to develop talents that can develop their own professional
careers in the civilian sector while meeting the requirements of the
military when they are called on. Again, the organizational answer is to
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be found in management theory, which addresses the need for enterprises
to constantly remake themselves to survive, although Li and Song accept
that this kind of constant remaking of the rules will be harder to adjust
to for Asian societies with collectivist cultures derived from their agricul-
tural mode of life (pp. 299–300).
Of course, viewing such issues through the eyes of management theory
is one way to try to depoliticize what are ultimately highly sensitive
political issues generated by the impact of ICTs. While most of these are
closely related to the fate of the authoritarian state that is discussed in
works like You’ve Got Dissent and Open Networks, they also cause much
wider waves, which have to be incorporated into the social science
research agenda. While Open Networks makes a good attempt to develop
such a new agenda, ultimately it is still somewhat limited by the
self-imposed task of its authors to question the conventional wisdom.
Perhaps both academics and policy-makers have already moved on to
more complex issues, and asking whether the Internet is a force for
liberalization is now no more appropriate as a question to guide research
than is asking whether the printing press is a force for liberalization. The
answer for both is yes and no, depending on how the technology is
appropriated by any particular society. As some of the new Chinese
literature indicates, there are also many other phenomena generated by
the impact of ICTs in China that are worth studying.
